Deputy Director General, M Kekana : opening remarks during official opening of financing pathways for just transition, mitigation and adaptation meeting

03 June 2025

A. Policy and political grounding for the dialogue

Let me thank SouthSouthNorth for engaging with the Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment for hosting this meeting. Also, thanks to the Federal Republic of Germany for funding this work to explore an Africa-led narrative on financial flows for climate action.

This meeting and the outcome of the research work come at an important time for Africa, developing countries as a whole, and in fact the urgency of international collaboration and action on climate change.

At COP30, not only will we be able to ascertain the ambitions level of national actions in countries update Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC), thus enabling an honest discussion whether the Paris Goal are in reach, or whether on its tenth anniversary, will we declare what Langston Hughes in his seminal poem Harlem referred to as a “dream deferred” i.e. what happens to the hope of a community, when a vision or hope is continuously put off or delayed.

The Paris goals are more than just a dream or a hope.

As global temperatures rise above pre-industrial levels, the losses and damages from climate change are intensifying, with both low and middle-income countries bearing the brunt. The frequency and intensity of loss and damage events have continued to escalate alongside the numerous emerging and persistent challenges faced by developing countries. Estimates of funding needs for economic damages alone in developing countries are now projected to be in the order of USD 395 billion in 2025, with a range of 128-937 billion. The increasing rate of climate-induced events continues to disproportionately affect countries that can least afford the costs of recovery and rebuilding.

Yearly estimates of Africa’s infrastructure financing requirements range from USD 130 to USD 170 billion. Undertaking measures to improve the resilience of these investments must become the main occupation for Africa's decision-makers.

Planning new infrastructure for climate resilience and adapting existing infrastructure to reduce risks should be a priority, as there is a high probability that climate change will offset or reduce the economic and developmental benefits of such infrastructure.

Climate change impacts will be genuine during the life span of the planned and future infrastructure within the coming decade. If climate risks are not taken into account now, there is a considerable risk that the next generation of infrastructure in Africa will be locked into designs that could be inadequate for the future climate, and costly, or impossible to modify later.

Establishing just transition pathways and making financial flows consistent with these pathways will benefit Africa by increasing access to investment flows tied to the global low-carbon shift.

We know that in the UNFCCC negotiations, the Parties are struggling to agree on a common understanding among themselves on the operationalisation of Article.2.1c in a way that does not constrain growth, while at the same time achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement and economic, social, and sustainable development while balancing support to pathways for adaptation and mitigation.

We also know that during COP26, all Parties recognised the multiple forms and stages of Just Transitions in the Glasgow Climate Pact. Significantly, Parties stressed that Just Transitions would entail the realisation of pathways to promote sustainable development, poverty eradication, and provision of climate finance, especially in a post-COVID-19 scenario. The COP/CMA also called on Parties to ensure that just transition financing is incorporated into approaches to align climate action with the goals of the Paris Agreement.

Africa has further indicated that agreeing on the scope of the JT Work programme and its financing will be a significant movement forward.

The sad reality is that What we expected from the implementation of the Goal is not materialising.

Africa holds significant energy resources, with estimates that fossil fuels represent around 40% of African exports. Despite this, more than 600 million people do not have access to electricity, and around 900 million people lack access to clean cooking. Ironically, Africa also possesses some of the globe's most significant potential for renewable energy generation. In 2021, data indicates Africa has represented only 0.5% of the new capacity globally- the lowest level since 2012. IRENA estimates the technical potential of wind power generation at 461 GW. However, wind generation capacity in Africa is on average only 6.5 GW. It was dream that the Paris Goals would reduce these trends.

Regrettably, on this we can declare that we are watching with open eyes the dream being deferred.

Similarly, the currently political discussions on the Paris Goals tend to drive countries apart rather than reinforce the principles of Global Solidarity.

We must avoid approaches that encourage abrupt disinvestments from fossil fuels. This approach poses a threat to Africa because of the unintended impact on jobs, the economy, energy, food security, and the ability to mobilise finance itself.

Developing countries need the development space to transition, and it should be acknowledged, respected, and supported. A transition to an environmentally sustainable, climate change resilient, low emissions economy and a just society does not happen overnight.

Some actions only tend to diminish efforts to mobilise finance and empower developing countries. We need to continue to raise and address our need for development, which includes answering the following:

1. What do we do with existing fossil-based assets? 

2. What sort of additional policies and measures will be needed by developing countries to create new asset classes in the low emissions sectors, and the practicality of developing these within this short space of time? 

3. How much will it cost, and how long will it take to mobilise and deliver the resources to shift away from embedded carbon assets? 

4. What sort of institutional and legal transformations are required to prepare the sector to be able to accommodate new asset classes, and what capacity support is needed for the transition? 

5. What are the expected levels of public sector support from developed countries to support the transition? 

6. How is the diffusion of new technologies to support new asset classes to be delivered and deployed?

The situation is equally opaque for adaptation. Without adaptation action, the Global Commission on Adaptation, and others such as the UNECA, estimate that climate change will lead to an equivalent of 2% to 4% annual loss in GDP in the continent by 2040.

Currently, over 50% of Africa’s population is food insecure, and 280 million are malnourished. If no action is taken, climate impacts will lead to overall yield reductions of up to 30% by 2050, while extreme weather events will result in higher post-harvest quality and quantity losses.

B. What happens if the dream is continuously deferred beyond COP30?

In 2023, Parties, in the Sharm Implementation Plan, agreed that delivering the funding needed to meet Article 2 will require a transformation of the financial system and its structures and processes, engaging governments, central banks, commercial banks, institutional investors and other financial actors.

The current financial architecture features an unfortunate reality where developing countries, those that have least contributed to the climate problem, continue to shoulder climate costs, albeit their very limited fiscal space and constrained economies.

C. Being solution-oriented in policy approaches

We need to see demonstrable progress on the reform of the International Financial Architecture to ensure that it delivers effectively and fairly for everyone.

We must go further to ensure that the evolution of the Multilateral Development Banks enables these institutions to mobilise stable and long-term financing at scale for public sector investments needed to combat climate change and sustainable development.

The reform of the international financial architecture, as well as the evolution of the MDBs, remains critical to unlocking the necessary levels of concessional resources at scale.

We further need to address the form of the finance available to developing countries and, in particular, put in place measures that climate finance does not lead to the increased debt burden of African and other developing countries. Credit enhancement approaches are readily available to the private sector, but urgent reforms are needed in the public sector.

We must pioneer the deployment of new financial instruments, particularly non-debt instruments, policy-based guarantees, and options that do not require sovereign guarantees. These instruments should focus on the economic costs of transition risk by taking first-loss risks on investments in technologies that are not yet commercially available.

This is for South Africa and the African Group, the vision captured in the Paris Dream. We cannot afford to defer the dream in Belem.

In Belem, Parties will conclude deliberations on the 2-year Sharm El Sheik Dialogue, which is focusing on the relationship between Article 2.1c and Article 9 of the Paris Agreement, which contains, in particular, the financial obligations of developed countries. Even at this stage, views on the future discussions on 2.1c remain inconclusive, with developed countries wanting solutions related to top-down regulatory actions to be imposed on financial institutions and banks; and developing countries arguing for the importance of needs, and space for development without top-down unilateral measures, without changing the obligation of developed countries to provide financial support.

I have no doubt this workshop can help inform our deliberations on next steps and potential solutions. South Africa is also using its G20 presidency platform to focus on solutions on how best to use public resources to mobilise private sector investment in low emissions and climate resilient development.

I do not doubt in my mind that the discussion on Article 2.1(c) even where they are not referred to as such, can and will lead to realigning financial flows toward low-emission, climate-resilient development.

With these few remarks, I officially declare the meeting open. I wish you fruitful discussions over the next 2 days.

Thank you.